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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

RUSSELL S. SCHOW, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

i

vs.

GUARDTONE, INC., et al.,
\
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 10546

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GUARDTONE INC.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellants together with 32 other Plaintiffs filed suit
to set aside certain contracts entered into by them for the
purchase of merchandise, on rt:he ground that Respondents
were guilty of fraudulent representations as to the intention of Respondents to perform certain ancillary agreeents in connection with a "Referral Sales Program".

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellants' statement of the disposition of the case
in the lower Court is essentially correct except rt:Jhat Respondent Guardtone Inc., at the close of Appellants' evi-

dence, made a Motion For A [)irected Verdict in 1·ts f avor
which motion was taken under advisement by the Cow~
(TR. 106). The motion was renewed by Respondent Guarct.
tone Inc. at the close of all of the evidence (TR. 132).
After a verdict of the jury in favor of Appellants, Re.spondent Guardtone Inc. made an Alternative IVIotion For Judg.
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict or For A New Trial
(R. 168). Said motion was granted by the Court below
and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, no cause of ,
action, was entered. The Alternative Motion For A New
Trial was also conditionally granted, to take effect only in
the event the Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, no
cause of action, should be reversed upon appeal (R. 184).
R~PONDENT'S

POSITION ON APPEAL

Respondent Guardtone Inc. seeks affirmance of the
action of the Court below in entering its Judgment Nat·
withstanding The Verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent Guardtone Inc. agrees with the statement
of facts as outlined by the Appellants in their brief to the
extent that such statement discloses that the Appellan1S '
entered into contracts for the purchase of a fire alarm and
intercommunication system, but it believes that a more
detailed statement of the transactions will be helpful to
the Court. Consequently, Respondent Guardtone Inc. set.I
forth the following statement as to the facts in this CP~~ ,
On or about the 7th day of September, 1962, Appellants
executed and delivered four separate instruments to one
Albert J. Hu~es, agent for Guardtone of Utah, a Utah
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corporation, and Respondent Guardrtone Inc., a Nevada
Corporation, in connection with Appellants' purchase of
an inter-com system and fire alarm installation, as evidenced by Exhibit No. 1, indicated as a Contract; Exhibit
No. 2, denominated as a Home Modernization Contract;
Exhibit No. 5, oharacterized as a Bonus Apporintment Guarantee; and Exhibit No. 6, characterized as an Advertising
Agreement. The Contract, the Home Modernraation Contract and the Bonus Apointmnt Guarantee were signed by
Albert J. Hughes on behalf of Guardtorne of Utah and the
Advertising Agreement was signed by Albert J. Hughes
0n behalf of Respondent Guardtone Inc. As indicated in
Appellants' Brief, the transaction included a "Reference
Sales Plan" agreement as particularly indicated in the
Bonus Appointment Guarantee and in 1:!he Advertising
Agreemmt above referred to. Hlowever, all of the written instruments. and particularly the Contract, the Bonus
Appointment Guarantee and the Advertising Agreement
clearly set forth the fact that Appellants' obligation for
the purchase price of the merchandise involved should not
in any way be affected by the promise of possible payment
to the Appellants as compensation for such referral names
as may have been submitted by Appellants and for further
sales of equipment made as a consequence of the furnishing of such names. Appellants freely admit having read
and understood the documents signed by them (TR. 46, 47,
53 l and there is no dispute as to the fact that the equipment contracted for was installed in the home of the Appellants as agreed (TR. 26). As set forth in Appellants'
Brief, they furnished a substantial number of names to Mr.
Hughes but as far as Appellants knew, no sales were made

as a result of the referral names furnished by them. Appellants freely admitted that they knew that payments for
the purchase price of the prop2'rty involved were to be
made directly to Respondent Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan Association and in fact 6 such payments were
made to said Respondent (TR. 45, 46, 77), but that the)
discontinued malting any further payments when they did
not receive any money from Guardtone of Utah under the
said Bonus Appointment Guarantee. Appellants acknowldged that they knew that they had themselves been referred as prospects under the referral plan arrangement
and that Cecil Chamberlain who had furnished their name
was paid $100.00 under a similar Advertising Agreement
by Guardtone Inc. when the Appellants agrea:l to purchase
the inter-com and fire alarm systems (TR. 62, 63, and 92).
Appellants further admitted in their testimony that to their
knowledge 2 or 3 of the persons whose names they fur.
nished under the referral program were contacted by representatives of Guardtone of Utah (TR. 30, 63), and they
also testified that they understood that such money as they
might receive under the referral plan could be used by
them for such purpcr~ as they may desire, and the same
was not specifically committed to the payment for the
merchandise contracted for by them (TR. 62, 93).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT·
ING JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING TIIE VERDICT
FOR THE REASON TIIAT TIIE EVIDENCE WAS IN·
SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH
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THAT THE RESPONDENT GUARDTONE INC.

DID
;~OT INTEND TO PERFORM THE ALLEGED PROMISE TI-IAT THE APPELLANTS COULD RECEIVE SUMS
VNDER THE ADVERTISNG AGREEMENT SO AS TO
EN_\BLE THE APPELLANTS TO PAY FOR THE
SQU1Fl\'IEI\i1 .eUHCHASED BY THEM.
The main contention of Appellants seems to be that
ti~,'.\' ,110~dcl be entitlctl to be relieved of their obligation to
p·.:, ~·.;.' the prop,~rty purchased by them for the reason
triat it was rciJi'L'sented to them by agents of Guardtone of
LJ'.c,h or Res;,Jondent Guardtone Inc., that irrespective of
wh<~iETe' dc<:'.uments they may have signed in the course
uf tl;e tl'<rnsac1ion, the i:..:ppellants would never have to pay
£2~· the merchandise from money of their own, but that
[;::y:-:.1ent in any a.ml all events would come through the
referral pl2.n arrangement sufftcient to meet their commitL1ents lL"1jer the contracts of purchase, but that at the
t.me such allesed r2pr~...,entations were made, if in fact
they ever were mccG.e in such a way, which fact Respondent Cunrdtone Inc. asserts the record in this case belies,
foe agent of Guardtone of Utah or of Respondent Guardtone Inc. never intended to perform under the Bonus Appointment Guarante·~ er the Advertising Agreement.
The only evidence offered by the Appellants to establish this state of mind on the part of Albert J. Hughes is
tl1e :act that they did not receive any money under the
Bonus Appointment Guarantee or under the Advertising
Agreemrnt. In this connection, it is called to the attenticn of the Court that the Bonus Appointment Guarantee
was between th..:: App·ellant, Russell S. Schow, and Guard-

ton~ of Utah, while it was only the Advertising Agrternent

which was between the Appellants and Respondent Guarct.
tone Inc. (Exhibit No. 5 and Exhibit No. 6).

The only points citEd in Appellants' Brief which they
contend establish this alleged fraudulent state of mind on
the part of Albert J. Hughes, were that the tdephone mun.
her of Guardtone or Utah was changed a nwnber of times
and finally disconnected; that Albert J. Hughes disappeared; the unsupported contention that the Snerirt wa£
unable to serve Albert J. Hughes; that Albert J. Hugues
did not appear at the trial; that three appomtments tor a
salesman to call on a particular party suggested by the
Appellants were not kept by Guardtone of Utah; and lastly
tJhat they did not receive any payments from either Guardtone of Utah o.c Respondent Guardtone Inc. In this con·
nection, attention of the Court is directed to the fact that
the obligation of Respondent Guardtone Inc. to make payment wider the Advertising Agreement was in any and ali
events contingent upon a sale actually being made to someone referred by the Appellants and nowhere do the Appel·
!ants contend that any such sale was in fact made.
Notwithstanding the position taken by Appellants in
their Brief, the testimony of the Appellants themselvt'S
eliminates the contention of a fraudulent state of mind oo
the part of Albert J. Hughes at the time the contract was
entered into because, as testified to by the Appellants, they
both knew that their names had been referred by one Cecil
Chamberlain who was paid the $100.00 referral fee under
an Advertising Agreement by Respondent Guardtone Jnc.
soon after the Appellants signed the contractual agreements, (TR. 62, 63, 92) and that Appellants kneW of at
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leru."i two or three persons whose names they had furnished
who had been contacted (TR. 30 and 63).
As stated in 23 American Jurisprudence, page 799:
"It is a general rule that fraud cannot be predicated

upon statements which are promissory in their nature
when made and which relate to future actions or conduct, upon the mere failure to perform a promise (nonperformance of a contractual obligation) or upon failure to fulfill an agreement to do something at a future
time or to make good sub",,,equent conditions which
have been assured. Such non-performance alone has
frequently been held not even to constitute evidenre
of fraud." (See Papanikolas -vs- Sampson 73 Utah
404; 274 P.ac. 856) .

This Honorable Court in the case of Nelson -vs- Lemington Mines and Exploration Corporation 87 Utah 69, 48
Pac. 2nd 439, held that fraud involved in a fraudulent rep-

resentation must relate to facts then existing or which
have pre\>iously existed and generally the failure to make
good on a promise is merely a breach of contract which
must be enforced by action on the contract, if at all, and
that in order to predicate an action for fraud upon failure
to perform a promise, there must be an intention an the
part of the promissor at the time of making the promi1E
not to perform. Non-performance of a promise alone is
not evidence of fraud.
It is true it is stated in 23 American Jurisprudence at
page 885, that a majority of American Courts hold that
fraud may be predicated on promises made with the present intention not to perform them or, as the rule is fie..
quently expressed, on promises made without an intention
of performance, and that for such fraudulent promises re-

lief may be had as the circumstances and issues presented
demand, citing Hull -vs- Flinde:.c; 83 Utah 158; 27 Pac. 2nd
56, and as pointed out by this Honorable Court in the case
of Fleming -v~ Fieming-Felt Compan:,', 7 Utah 2nd 293
323 Pac. 2nd 712,
'

"It· IS
. not c1--.o ·be garnsam
.
. ' tnat
.
w1 J e1· sonk ._ircurmtar,ce3
it may be po3sible to shO'\V that a P~'o:n;ssor has a Df'.
conceived determination not to perform, but such i:.:L:;;
be shown by clear and convincing e\rid2nc:e."

But the burden of establishing such fraud as charged here
by the Appellants is that such fraud must be shown b~
clear and convincing evidence, Kelly -v&- Salt Lake Tra&·
portation Company, 100 Utah 436; 116 Pac. 2nd 383; Unive~ C.I.T. Credit Corp. -vs- Sohm, 15 Utah 2nd 262, 391
Pac: 2nd 293.
Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that there is no
clear and convincing evidence in this case as to foe state
of mind of Albert J. Hughes at the time of the transactions
involved not to perform under the Bonm Appointment
Guarantee or the Advertising Agre€ment, but on the con·
trary, the evidence from the Appellants thems:lv2s is that
there was an intention to perform since at least partial p€r·
formance did in fact occur within the knowledge of Appel·
lants. Appellants did not testify or show tlwt they had
contracted any of the persons whose names were submittetl
by them to see whether or not they had in fact been con·
tacted by Guardtone of Utah other than the one person
referred to on Page 5 of the Appellants' Brief, as contrested
with thEir te3timony hereinabove indicated that they did
know of at least two or three who had been so contactro ..
Respondent Guardtone Inc. further asserts that in any
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event the Appellants did not rely or have any right to rely
upon any promises indicated in the Bonus Appointment
Guarante and the Advertising Agreement insofar as their
obligation under the Home Modernization Contract to pay
for the merchandise bought is concerned, since all instruments, as herein.above indicated, specifically and clearly
set forth the fact that ·any agreement for compensation
under the Bonus Appointment Guarantee or the Advertising Agreement should not in any way affect the obligation
of Appellants to pay as set forth by the terms and conditic.ms of the contracts for the purchase of the equipment
tllerein described.

Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that the Court
below did not err in granting the Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding The Verdict on the grounds that there
was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to show any
fraud on the part of Respondent Guardtone Inc. In fact,
the only evidence in the case on the matter, which evidence
is testimony of the Appellants themselves, compels the condusion that there was every intention to perform at the
time the instruments were signed and that in fact there
was at least partial performance as evidenced by the fact
that some of the names submitted by the Appellants were
contacted, the edvertising agreement fee of $100.00 was
paid to the person who referred the names of the Appellants, and Appellants could say that to their knowledge
actually only one person whose name was submitted was
not cont.acted. Inasmuch as the general rule is that nonperformance alone is not even evidence of fraud and since
the allegation of fraud must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, the Appellants failed to make out a case
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as a matter of law and the action of the trial Court should
therefore be sustained.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN SEPARATING THE APPELLANTS CLAIMS FOR TRIAL AND IN
EXCLUDING PROFERRED ALLEGEID EVIDENCE OF
OTHER FRAUDULENT PROMISES AND NON-PERFORMANCE.

Under Rule 20(b) and Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the trial Court has the discretion to i~
quire that separate issues be tried separately and was
clearly within the scope of these rules when it directe<l
that the claims of the Appellants be tried first independent
of the other Plaintiffs named in the Complaint.
Insofar as the offer of proof referred to in the Appellants' Brief at page 9 is concerned, it was apparently Appel·
lants' intention rto oa.11 other witnesses who had entered in·
to contracts with Guardtone of Utah an.d Respondent
Guardtone Inc. under similar circumstances testified to by
the Appellants. Since the only basis for the fraud alleged
by Appellants was complete non-performance by Guardtone of Utah and Respondent Guardtone Inc., which allegation was, as hereinbefore pointed out, not borne out by
the testimony of Appellants themselves, and since mere
evidene of non-performance is generally held not even to
constitute evidence of fraud (23 Am. Jur. 799; Papanikolas -vs- Sampson, Supra), compounding such evidence could
be of no assistance in the detrminatioo of the matter as a
matter of law, and the Court was within its rights in ex·
eluding such evidence.
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The Coort further had before it in the case, Answers

to Interrogatories propounded by the Appellants to Respondent Guardtone Inc. on behalf of all of the named
Plaintiffs in the action, sp2dfically Interrogatory No. 6
(R. 78), where it was rquired of Respondent Guardtone
Inc. to furnish information concerning payments made 1.Ulder the Advertising Agreement. In the Answers to such
;r.t2rrogatories ( R. 90) , payments were indicated which
clearly refute a.riy co-ntention that Respondent Guardtone
L11c. had no intention to perform.
The trial Court had full discretion to separate the
claims of the various and numerous Plaintiffs for trial and
denial of Appellants' offer to provide repetitious 1:e$timony
of legally insufficient evidence was not error.

POINT ID
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEf'ERMINING
THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE INDEBTED TO PRUDEN'ITAL ON THE CONTRACT SUED UPON.
The Court submitted to the jury the question of
whether Plaintiffs by their dealings with Prudential, had
elected to treat Prudential as the asfilgnee, owner and payee of the contract L11 question. The jury's answer was
"Yes." <R. 154, 155). This finding of the jury is amply
supported by the evidence.

Mr. Schow signed a statement addressed t.o Prudential to the effect that the materials and/or work described
in the Home Modernization Contract dated Sept.ember 12,
1962, had been delivered and completed to his satisfaction
(Ex. 12) . Plaintiffs were advised, in writing, by Pruden-
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tial that it had purchased their Home Improvement Note
(Ex. 13). Mr. Schow testified fuat he knew they were

dealing with Prudential and that payment for the mer.
chandise was to be made direct to Prudential (TR. 45, 46,
77). Thereafter Plaintiffs made six payments of $29.40
each to Prudential as provided for in the contract (TR.
55). Plaintiffs received a CQIU!pon book from Prudential.
Mrs. Schow advised Prudential that "Our name on our
coupon payment book was spelled wrong." (Ex. 13). Mrs.
Schow had three telephone conversations with someone
at Prudential, two with reference to the installation of the
equipment and one in connection with Ex. 13 (TR. 82).
Appellants argue that when a person sues on an assigned claim the obligor is entitled to the protection of being assured that payment to the assignee will discharge
the obligation. Appellants have such protection in this
case. Guardtone of Utah and Guardtone Inc., are parties
in this action, have been served with proceS3 and are suiJ.
ject to the order of the Court. Neither has ~ed own·
ership of, or a claim on the contract herein sued upon.
They are both bound by the judgment of this Court to the
effect that Prudential is the owner of the contract.
Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that Section 25·
1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited by Appellants, has
no bearing on the question at hand. The record discloses
no evidence which would support a contention that Guardtone of Utah made any assignment of the contract with an
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor.
The jury found that the Appellants elected to treat
Prudential as the assignee, owner and payee of the oon·
tract in question. There is no evidence to the controJY·
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Appellants are protected against any claim on the contract
in question being asserted by Guardtone of Utah and Guard-

tone Inc. Such being true, the Court did not err in holding that Appellants are obligated to Prudential on the cont.rd.ct sued upon.
CONCLUSION

The action of the Court below should be affirmed. 'I1he
evidence introduced by the Appellants at the trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury verdict
against Respondent Guardtone Inc. Not only did the evidence show that Appellants were willing to lend their
names to the referral sales program, but there was substantial evidence introduced by Appellants themselves to
compel the conclusion that Respondent Guardtone Inc.
fully intend€d to perform and did perform any promises
attributable to it at the time the contracts involved were
executed. The evidence showed no fraud on the part of
Respondent Guardtone Inc., or anyone else, much less establish it in a clear and convincing way.
Respectfully submitted,
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent, Guardtone, Inc.

